The Transportation Security Administration is promising a “full review” after the release of an unredacted version of its Screening Management Standard Operating Procedures over the weekend.
The existence of the document, first reported yesterday on the blog Wandering Aramean, was a brief sensation in the travel blogosphere — until people read the manual. Not only was it boring. It was also obsolete.
What gave this story more than its 15 seconds of Internet fame? Probably the fact that TSA had meant to redact certain portions, but because of an apparent lack of computer skills, it failed to effectively do so.
This afternoon, TSA released the following statement on the manual:
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has become aware that a outdated version of a Standard Operating Procedures document was improperly posted by the agency to the Federal Business Opportunities Web site wherein redacted material was not properly protected.
TSA takes this matter very seriously and took swift action when this was discovered. A full review is now underway.
TSA has many layers of security to keep the traveling public safe and to constantly adapt to evolving threats. TSA has appropriate measures in place to effectively screen passengers at airport security checkpoints nationwide.
Wandering Aramean had harsh words for the agency charged with protecting air travelers:
It is pretty pathetic that the folks supposedly responsible for administering this “security” program cannot even be bothered to do the simplest parts of their job correctly. Then again, passing through the checkpoint every time I fly it is pretty clear that they do a lot of things incorrectly. Just chalk this one up to more of the same idiocy. More done badly.
I’m told that this version of the Standard Operating Procedures was actually never implemented. So although this document gives us a good idea of TSA’s current procedures, it should in no way be considered up-to-date, or even accurate. My source says it’s been revised six times since the release. (Why release something that was never implemented? It’s a mystery.)
I spoke with a person who is familiar with redaction boo-boos. Her take?
The elementary error they made in redaction using Microsoft Word is a fairly common piece of stupidity. Word jockeys and technical writers laugh or cry every time this happens. It’s truly idiotic.
That said, as a former government consultant I can say that the document is probably born of compromise, not followed in practice, and written by a team of consultants trying to mediate the various views of various stakeholders.
As if people on the front lines are going to read all that!
It’s a mistake nobody makes more than once.
This is by no means the first time someone has redacted without redacting. A few years ago it led to this interesting story. Maybe TSA should have read this handy redaction how-to from the NSA before releasing this into the wild.
What do you think? Have you read the TSA SOP? Anything interesting in there that we haven’t noticed yet?
(Photo: goldberg/Flickr Creative Commons)
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Thanks for the link-back and for reading it after I mentioned it during the WaPo chat this afternoon.
A few interesting things about this. Yes, it was quite certainly a human error that the redaction didn’t work correctly. But that’s not an excuse. Whether juicy or not it is clear that the content “blacked out” was not supposed to be shared with the public. And now the TSA expects us to trust them in cleaning up the mess.
Second, the version of the TSA response I got was that this version was “outdated” rather than never implemented. Moreover, even if this explicit version was not implemented it is almost certain that pieces of it were. Most likely huge chunks of it.
And then there are the “juicy” bits. Want to know what the x-ray machines resolution is in terms of noticing wires in a carry-on bag? That information is in the document. So are the details on where the folks testing the magnetometers conceal their “gun” as they verify functionality. Interested in bypassing the selectee screening process? Probably not so relevant any more, but the information is in the document. Oh, and the list of twelve countries from which every single citizen is deemed a risk to American air safety is laughable were it not so sad.
Perhaps the greatest irony, however, is just how ridiculous some of the redacted content is. Why is it important that the public not know that the TSOs are to change their gloves if the ETD machine reports a positive result? The fact that the TSA continues to hide behind the SSI designation whenever they are pressed for answers by the general public is a farce, especially when taken in the light of just how ridiculous some of the things designated as SSI are.
As a technical writer, and someone who has developed many cross-functional SOPs, I can confirm both points made by your “person who is familiar with redaction boo-boos.” Specifically – that Microsoft Word can be a real pain (and if they recently upgraded to Vista, it’s a nightmare – unlearn everything you learned and start over!). AND, many SOPs are not so much documentation of actual processes or procedures, as they are exercises in getting down on paper the personal agendas and pet issues of competing stakeholders in whatever process is being documented. I can’t tell you the number of SOPs that I have written that are unfollowable in practice.
This does not necessarily reflect on the ability of the organization to proficiently perform its core function. All it means is that 1) some technical writer or doc person doesn’t know how to use Word, and 2) TSA is like any other organization in terms of its internal political struggles with process documentation.
I’m NOT suggesting TSA actually does what it’s supposed to do well. In fact, I personally think they are completely incompetent! I’m just pointing out that the fact that this *thing* happened with this wrong version of an SOP says nothing whatsoever about their competency at TSA’ing.