Untrustworthy fliers

Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge’s proposal to create a “trusted flier” program that prescreens passengers is the most dangerous idea for improving airline safety since the government federalized airport security last year.

It’s impossible to reverse the knee-jerk decision that led to the creation of a vast federal bureaucracy consisting largely of former rent-a-cops.

But we can – and we should – do everything in our power to prevent the “trusted flier” program from becoming a reality. If we don’t, then we’ll soon have yet another unwieldy bureaucracy on our hands. And this one will be fundamentally unfair, unnecessary, and very likely, unsafe.

Under Ridge’s proposal, airline passengers would voluntarily pay a fee and agree to background checks in return for a special pass designed to speed them through airport security. He likens the new cards to memberships in a frequent flier club: so-called “low risk” passengers would, in effect, get preferential treatment, much the way elite frequent travelers do today.

Problem is, we’re already paying for better security. Not only has the U.S. Department of Transportation imposed a $2.50 “September 11 Security Fee” on each air carrier passenger enplanement to help offset the cost of aviation security. But as taxpayers, chances are we’re about to spend even more.

The Transportation Security Administration, the new agency charged with protecting the nation’s transportation systems, was funded at a cost of $2.4 billion last year. Now the agency says it needs an additional $4.4 billion this year alone, which reportedly will make it larger than the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, The Customs Service and the Border Patrol combined.

Why should we pay for something that we’re already paying for? An argument could be made in favor of the “trusted flier” program if Ridge could show that it would improve security. After all, you can never be too safe. But he can’t.

In fact, these cards could make airline travel more risky. The first thing any halfway intelligent terrorist would do after the implementation of these passes is to acquire a trusted flier card. No matter how foolproof the government tries to make the system, someone will find a way to foil it – even if it incorporates the most advanced biometric systems, the most sophisticated databases and the latest encryption technology.

A second problem with the any preferred traveler plan is enforcement. How do the new federal screeners intend to allow trusted fliers to speed through their checkpoints? Will they bother to make these low-risk passenger power up their laptop computers? To pass through a metal detector? To remove their shoes? No, in all likelihood the security guards will thoughtlessly wave these travelers through their checkpoint. So when a card is forged, there’s no telling what a well-trained terrorist could bring on a plane with him.

Advocates of the trusted flier program have their own selfish reasons for wanting the system, and none of them have anything to do with improving safety. The people who back these cards support an antiquated two-class system for air travel. They endorse an institution that divides “haves” and “have-nots” the moment they arrive at the airport.

Elite-level frequent fliers and VIPs stand in a shorter ticketing line, wait for their flight in an airline club and sit in first class. The rest of us wait in long lines, sit in a common waiting area and are relegated to uncomfortable steerage class seats.

Now the privileged passengers who support this separation are demanding the government subsidize another perk: they want to cut in line at the security checkpoint.

We can’t allow that.

Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge’s proposal to create a “trusted flier” program that prescreens passengers is the most dangerous idea for improving airline safety since the government federalized airport security last year.

It’s impossible to reverse the knee-jerk decision that led to the creation of a vast federal bureaucracy consisting largely of former rent-a-cops.

But we can – and we should – do everything in our power to prevent the “trusted flier” program from becoming a reality. If we don’t, then we’ll soon have yet another unwieldy bureaucracy on our hands. And this one will be fundamentally unfair, unnecessary, and very likely, unsafe.

Under Ridge’s proposal, airline passengers would voluntarily pay a fee and agree to background checks in return for a special pass designed to speed them through airport security. He likens the new cards to memberships in a frequent flier club: so-called “low risk” passengers would, in effect, get preferential treatment, much the way elite frequent travelers do today.

Problem is, we’re already paying for better security. Not only has the U.S. Department of Transportation imposed a $2.50 “September 11 Security Fee” on each air carrier passenger enplanement to help offset the cost of aviation security. But as taxpayers, chances are we’re about to spend even more.

The Transportation Security Administration, the new agency charged with protecting the nation’s transportation systems, was funded at a cost of $2.4 billion last year. Now the agency says it needs an additional $4.4 billion this year alone, which reportedly will make it larger than the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, The Customs Service and the Border Patrol combined.

Why should we pay for something that we’re already paying for? An argument could be made in favor of the “trusted flier” program if Ridge could show that it would improve security. After all, you can never be too safe. But he can’t.

In fact, these cards could make airline travel more risky. The first thing any halfway intelligent terrorist would do after the implementation of these passes is to acquire a trusted flier card. No matter how foolproof the government tries to make the system, someone will find a way to foil it – even if it incorporates the most advanced biometric systems, the most sophisticated databases and the latest encryption technology.

A second problem with the any preferred traveler plan is enforcement. How do the new federal screeners intend to allow trusted fliers to speed through their checkpoints? Will they bother to make these low-risk passenger power up their laptop computers? To pass through a metal detector? To remove their shoes? No, in all likelihood the security guards will thoughtlessly wave these travelers through their checkpoint. So when a card is forged, there’s no telling what a well-trained terrorist could bring on a plane with him.

Advocates of the trusted flier program have their own selfish reasons for wanting the system, and none of them have anything to do with improving safety. The people who back these cards support an antiquated two-class system for air travel. They endorse an institution that divides “haves” and “have-nots” the moment they arrive at the airport.

Elite-level frequent fliers and VIPs stand in a shorter ticketing line, wait for their flight in an airline club and sit in first class. The rest of us wait in long lines, sit in a common waiting area and are relegated to uncomfortable steerage class seats.

Now the privileged passengers who support this separation are demanding the government subsidize another perk: they want to cut in line at the security checkpoint.

We can’t allow that.

Christopher Elliott is the author of Scammed: How to Save Your Money and Find Better Service in a World of Schemes, Swindles, and Shady Deals. Critics have called it “eye-opening” and “inspiring” — it’ll “grab your attention and won’t let go.” Order your copy now on Amazon, Barnes & Noble or iTunes.

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